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Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies

Author

Listed:
  • Bennie D. Waller

    (Longwood University)

  • Raymond T. Brastow

    (Longwood University)

Abstract

This study is the first to examine dual agency sales over the listing contract between seller and listing agent. We test hypotheses about the timing of dual agency and its effects on sales price and time on market. Probit results indicate that dual agency sales are more likely to occur near the beginning or the end of a listing contract. Three stage least squares results demonstrate that dual agency affects sales price in both periods and that dual agency sales have shorter marketing times. Results support the conclusion that dual agency sales result from both incentives and informational efficiencies. In the residential real estate market, buyers and sellers both rely greatly on

Suggested Citation

  • Bennie D. Waller & Raymond T. Brastow, 2013. "Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 35(2), pages 83-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:jre:issued:v:35:n:2:2013:p:199-222
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shen, Lily & Ross, Stephen, 2021. "Information value of property description: A Machine learning approach," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    2. Bian, Xun & Waller, Bennie D. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K. & Wentland, Scott A., 2015. "How many listings are too many? Agent inventory externalities and the residential housing market," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 130-143.
    3. Lawrence Kryzanowski & Yanting Wu & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 130-169, January.
    4. Xun Bian & Bennie D. Waller & Abdullah Yavas, 2017. "Commission Splits in Real Estate Transactions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 165-187, February.
    5. Lily Shen & Stephen L. Ross, 2019. "Information Value of Property Description: A Machine Learning Approach," Working papers 2019-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2020.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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