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Pricing, Exposure and Residential Listing Strategies

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Abstract

Sellers of houses signal their motivation or willingness to sell through price and contractual provisions in their listing agreements. A pricing strategy is for motivated sellers to set their listing prices at or below estimated market values as determined by the quality and other characteristics of the house. An exposure strategy is to set a listing price above estimated market value, and increase advertising and broker activity in order to generate more favorable offers. Pricing and exposure are competing strategies and may be revealed in listing contracts through the inclusion of a buyer-broker provision. Empirical results for the Washington, D.C. area indicate that brokers concentrate their time on sellers following the pricing strategy as opposed to those who follow the exposure strategy. There is a tradeoff between price and exposure. The results demonstrate a positive relationship between increasing listing price and using buyer brokerage.

Suggested Citation

  • John D. Benjamin & Peter T. Chinloy, 2000. "Pricing, Exposure and Residential Listing Strategies," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 62-74.
    • Handle: RePEc:jre:issued:v:20:n:1:2000:p:62-74
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    10. David Geltner & Brian D. Kluger & Norman G. Miller, 1991. "Optimal Price and Selling Effort from the Perspectives of the Broker and Seller," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kelley Cours Anderson & Julia Freybote & Kerry T. Manis, 2024. "The Impact of Virtual Marketing Strategies on the Price-TOM Relation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 218-234, February.
    2. Marcus T. Allen & Justin D. Benefield & Ronald C. Rutherford, 2023. "Co-Listing Strategies: Better Transaction Outcomes?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 517-544, October.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/515 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Chang, Chuang-Chang & Chao, Ching-Hsiang & Yeh, Jin-Huei, 2016. "The role of buy-side anchoring bias: Evidence from the real estate market," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 34-58.
    5. Oded Palmon & Ben J. Sopranzetti, 2017. "On the relationship between the number of a broker’s real estate listings and transaction outcomes," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 65-89, July.
    6. Anupam Nanda & Stephen Ross, 2012. "The Impact of Property Condition Disclosure Laws on Housing Prices: Evidence from an Event Study Using Propensity Scores," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 88-109, June.
    7. Elizabeth Hemphill, 2007. "Factors Affecting Real Estate Broker Selection: What Really Counts?," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 10(1), pages 1-25.
    8. Kenneth Soyeh & Jonathan Wiley & Ken Johnson, 2014. "Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 380-396, February.
    9. Jonathan Wiley & Leonard Zumpano & Justin Benefield, 2011. "The Limited-Service Brokerage Decision: Theory and Evidence," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 336-358, October.
    10. Bian, Xun & Waller, Bennie D. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K. & Wentland, Scott A., 2015. "How many listings are too many? Agent inventory externalities and the residential housing market," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 130-143.
    11. Bruce L. Gordon & Daniel T. Winkler, 2017. "The Effect of Listing Price Changes on the Selling Price of Single-Family Residential Homes," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 185-215, August.
    12. Velma Zahirovic-Herbert & Bennie D. Waller & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2020. "Properties that Sell at or above Listing Price: Strategic Pricing, Better Broker or Just Dumb Luck?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 53-76, February.

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    JEL classification:

    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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