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Private Protection Agencies and Infectious Diseases

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Sutter

    (Troy University)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Sutter, 2022. "Private Protection Agencies and Infectious Diseases," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(Spring 20), pages 61-77.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1844
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    2. Umbeck, John, 1981. "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 38-59, January.
    3. Cowen, Tyler, 1992. "Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 249-267, October.
    4. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies," Introductory Chapters, in: The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Princeton University Press.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bryan C. McCannon & Mark Wilson, 2023. "Mask Mandates Increased COVID-19 Deaths in Kansas," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(Winter 20), pages 29-54.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    COVID-19; emergency powers; constitutional economics; anarchy; pandemic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P1 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies

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