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Verhandlungen und das Coase Theorem / Verhandlungen und das Coase Theorem

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  • Althammer Wilhelm

    (Europa Universität Viadrina, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Postfach 776, D-15207 Frankfurt/Oder)

Abstract

This paper tries to give a formal proof of the Coase Theorem. In a first step it is shown in a general bargaining model without bargaining costs, that the efficiency of a solution depends on the strategies used by the parties (stationary or non-stationary). By transforming the game into a modified Rubinstein-Game, a unique and efficient solution is obtained. In this, however, there is still a potential for strategic threats (extortion). If the parties use these threats, multiple equilibria will result, some of which are inefficient. Therefore, even without bargaining costs, the Coase Theorem is not generally valid.

Suggested Citation

  • Althammer Wilhelm, 1995. "Verhandlungen und das Coase Theorem / Verhandlungen und das Coase Theorem," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 214(6), pages 641-662, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:214:y:1995:i:6:p:641-662
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-1995-0602
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