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Activity Based Management (ABM) and Control System design

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  • Leslie Kren

Abstract

This paper provides a discussion of control system design choices under a system of Activity Based Management (ABM). The costs and benefits of control under ABM are compared to those under objective control based on outcomes or results. Fundamentally, effective control under ABM relies on the available information to superiors about subordinate performance. To use ABM as a control tool, depends upon understanding the choices available to managers and the subsequent actions they followed to meet ABM goals. Thus, ABM requires investment in sophisticated information system capabilities and a flatter organization structure for effective monitoring of managers choices and decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Leslie Kren, 2018. "Activity Based Management (ABM) and Control System design," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 7(2), pages 1-61, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:jfr:afr111:v:7:y:2018:i:2:p:61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Agrawal, Anup & Mandelker, Gershon N, 1987. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decision s," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(4), pages 823-837, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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