IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/jfr/afr111/v5y2016i1p164.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modeling Equity Compensation under Accounting Contingencies

Author

Listed:
  • John Bizjak
  • Swaminathan Kalpathy
  • Rex Thompson

Abstract

Of late, both U.S. and International firms have increased the granting of performance-contingent equity awards to their executive officers. Beyond simple stock options, these awards frequently include accounting-based performance targets. Failure to meet or exceed these targets causes award forfeiture. While now a common component in executive pay, little is known about how to value these instruments. In this paper, we model the expected payoff from an equity award with accounting-based payout conditions. The model incorporates numerous characteristics of awards seen in practice, including the coupling of stock price and accounting targets, multiple accounting targets, sliding payout schedules, and the adoption of both “and†and “or†conditions that trigger payout. We also translate the expected payoff into an approximate present value. Given the growing prevalence of performance-contingent features in executive pay, this exercise is important to academics, board members and shareholders, along with other market participants and regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • John Bizjak & Swaminathan Kalpathy & Rex Thompson, 2016. "Modeling Equity Compensation under Accounting Contingencies," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(1), pages 164-164, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:jfr:afr111:v:5:y:2016:i:1:p:164
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.sciedupress.com/journal/index.php/afr/article/download/8463/5401
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.sciedupress.com/journal/index.php/afr/article/view/8463
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tian, Yisong S., 2004. "Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1225-1245, June.
    2. Murphy, Kevin J., 2013. "Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 211-356, Elsevier.
    3. Kuang, Yu Flora & Qin, Bo, 2009. "Performance-vested stock options and interest alignment," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 46-61.
    4. Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
    5. Antle, R & Smith, A, 1986. "An Empirical-Investigation Of The Relative Performance Evaluation Of Corporate-Executives," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 1-39.
    6. Ely, Km, 1991. "Interindustry Differences In The Relation Between Compensation And Firm Performance Variables," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 37-58.
    7. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, 2003. "Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 27-50.
    8. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Susana Alvarez-Diez & J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & Maria Belda-Ruiz, 2016. "Early Exercise Behaviour in Performance-vested Stock Option Grants," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 55-78, May.
    2. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    3. Kam C. Chan & Tao Chen & Baohua Liu & Junfeng Wu, 2022. "Air pollution and CEO compensation: Evidence from China," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 448-469, April.
    4. Giorgio Canarella & Mahmoud M. Nourayi, 2008. "Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 293-315.
    5. Hyungshin Park & Dimitris Vrettos, 2015. "The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 1055-1108, December.
    6. Baber, William R. & Kang, Sok-Hyon & Kumar, Krishna R., 1998. "Accounting earnings and executive compensation:: The role of earnings persistence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 169-193, May.
    7. Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1995. "Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 105-130, September.
    8. Baber, William R. & Janakiraman, Surya N. & Kang, Sok-Hyon, 1996. "Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 297-318, June.
    9. Luft, Joan & Shields, Michael D., 2003. "Mapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 169-249.
    10. Eli Talmor & James S. Wallace, 1998. "Computer Industry Executives: An Analysis of the New Barons' Compensation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 9(4), pages 398-414, December.
    11. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Holden, Craig W. & Kim, Daniel S., 2017. "Performance share plans: Valuation and empirical tests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 99-125.
    13. Kuang, Yu Flora & Qin, Bo, 2009. "Performance-vested stock options and interest alignment," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 46-61.
    14. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
    15. Bettis, J. Carr & Bizjak, John & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2018. "Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 194-221.
    16. Yenn-Ru Chen & Carl R. Chen & Chih-Kang Chu, 2014. "The Effect of Executive Stock Options on Corporate Innovative Activities," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 271-290, June.
    17. Agarwal, Vikas & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naik, Narayan Y., 2009. "Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance," CFR Working Papers 04-04, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    18. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    19. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
    20. Agarwal, Vikas & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naik, Narayan Y., 2009. "Do hedge funds manage their reported returns?," CFR Working Papers 07-09, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    21. Eric A. Fong, 2010. "Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(6), pages 1095-1122, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jfr:afr111:v:5:y:2016:i:1:p:164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sciedu Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepflch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.