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Bundling Competition Between Multi-Product And Single-Product Firms

Author

Listed:
  • JAE HYUN GWON

    (Korea Capital Market Institute, Korea)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a simple model where a multi-product firm competes with single-product firms possibly with bundling strategy. Mixed bundling is theoretically known as an effective business tool even in the symmetric competition as well as for the monopoly. Contrary to the literature, this paper shows that mixed bundling is dominated by component pricing or pure bundling. The result holds regardless of the product complementarity by the multi-product firm. In addition, it is shown that linear component pricing will be utilized for low complementarity while pure bundling strategy will be chosen for high complementarity.

Suggested Citation

  • Jae Hyun Gwon, 2015. "Bundling Competition Between Multi-Product And Single-Product Firms," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 40(3), pages 27-54, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:jed:journl:v:40:y:2015:i:3:p:27-54
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yin, Xiangkang, 2004. "Two-part tariff competition in duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 799-820, June.
    2. Lars A. Stole, 1995. "Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 529-562, December.
    3. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2001. "Competitive Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 579-605, Winter.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Lars A. Stole, 2002. "Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 277-311.
    5. Barry Nalebuff, 2000. "Competing Against Bundles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm157, Yale School of Management.
    6. Lewbel, Arthur, 1985. "Bundling of substitutes or complements," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-107, March.
    7. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
    8. Spulber, Daniel F., 1979. "Non-cooperative equilibrium with price discriminating firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 221-227.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lingzhi Shao & Qianwen Liu, 2022. "Decision-Making and the Contract of the Complementary Product Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Environmental Awareness and Government Green Subsidies," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(5), pages 1-27, March.
    2. Angelika Endres-Fröhlich & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Joachim Heinzel, 2022. "The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market," Working Papers Dissertations 91, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    3. Wen-wen Ren & Yong Liu & Qi Zhang & Xiao-ying Wang, 2022. "Sales strategies considering consumer purchasing preferences for imperfect complementary products," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(2), pages 164-182, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Duopolies; Bundling; Bundle Discount; Complementary Goods; Nonlinear Pricing; Product Differentiation; Price Discrimination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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