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The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Jue-Shyan Wang

    (Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

  • Hsiao-Yin Hung

    (Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taiwan)

Abstract

Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects.

Suggested Citation

  • Jue-Shyan Wang & Hsiao-Yin Hung, 2008. "The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 4(2), pages 125-143, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:jec:journl:v:4:y:2008:i:2:p:125-143
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobby; sequential equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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