The Effects of Network Structure on the Emergence of Norms in Adaptive Populations

The different ways individuals socialize with others affect the conditions under which social norms are able to emerge. In this work an agent-based model of cooperation in a population of adaptive agents is presented. The model has the ability to implement a multitude of network topologies. The agents possess strategies represented by boldness and vengefulness values in the spirit of Axelrod's (1986) norms game. However, unlike in the norms game, the simulations abandon the evolutionary approach and only follow a single-generation of agents who are nevertheless able to adapt their strategies based on changes in their environment. The model is analyzed for potential emergence or collapse of norms under different network and neighborhood configurations as well as different vigilance levels in the agent population. In doing so the model is found able to exhibit interesting emergent behavior suggesting potential for norm establishment even without the use of so-called metanorms. Although the model shows that the success of the norm is dependent on the neighborhood size and the vigilance of the agent population, the likelihood of norm collapse is not monotonically related to decreases in vigilance.