Sociological Implications of Gift Exchange in Multiagent Systems

In this paper, the implications of applying the idea of gift exchange mechanism, inspired from Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theories, into a market-based multiagent system are explored. Our work is directed in the continuation of investigations by Knabe (2002), who addressed the formation of different organizations structures between providers in a profit-oriented market. We nevertheless scrutinize various hypotheses centered to gift exchange in which an agent sacrifices its profit for a long-term binding relationship. The idea is to aim a larger profit through alliances that are formed as an effect of gift exchange. Our suggestion is that a multiagent system (MAS) based on the social mechanism of gift exchange performs a high level of robustness and durability. The market in our case comprises of customers and providers agents. The former calls for proposals for the tasks they introduce in the market, while the latter proceed with the execution of tasks based on their abilities and other circumstances. In well defined cases, the providers are able to delegate tasks to other providers. This allows them to give presents to other providers so that the gift exchange mechanism becomes possible. The agents are either profit-oriented or the ones who prefer exchanging gifts and are in pursuit of others who also practice this mechanism. A number of interesting scenarios are examined that include preservation of a hierarchical structure in the market, situations resulting in the forming of an alliance between two providers, and split of profit-oriented and gift-giving agents.