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Worldwide Nuclear Coalition Games: A Valuation of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces

Author

Listed:
  • Jerome Bracken

    (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut)

  • Martin Shubik

    (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut)

Abstract

Methods are proposed for the valuation of strategic offensive and defensive force structures, with emphasis on the consideration of incentives for the formation of coalitions. Coalitions consist of subsets of the nuclear weapons states, together with the nonnuclear weapons states taken as components of the total value target inventory. The basic approach is to formulate and solve two worldwide nuclear coalition games. In the first game, the first striking coalition is retaliated against by the surviving weapons of the second striking coalition, minimizing the objective function of the first striking coalition. In the second game, the surviving weapons of the second striking coalition are used to maximize its own objective function. The objective function in both models is the percent of surviving value. The games differ substantially. Computational results are presented for all possible coalitions of nuclear weapons states and neutrals. Offensive weapons, defensive weapons, and value target data bases are varied. Results are very sensitive to coalition composition, the number of value targets, and the number of offensive and defensive weapons.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerome Bracken & Martin Shubik, 1993. "Worldwide Nuclear Coalition Games: A Valuation of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 655-668, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:41:y:1993:i:4:p:655-668
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.41.4.655
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Shubik, 2018. "Who Gets What, When, How" Power, Organization, Markets, Money and the Allocation of Resources," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2118, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Oderanti, Festus Oluseyi & De Wilde, Philippe, 2010. "Dynamics of business games with management of fuzzy rules for decision making," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 96-109, November.
    3. Martin Shubik, 2018. "The Paradox of Competition: Power, Markets, and Money - Who Gets What, When, How"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2118R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000173, David K. Levine.
    5. Martin Shubik, 2018. "Who Gets What, When, How? Power, Organization, Markets, Money and the Allocation of Resources," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 3018, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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