Author
Listed:
- Zongsen Yang
(School of Data Science, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518172, China)
- Xingyu Fu
(School of Marketing, University of New South Wales Business School, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales 2052, Australia)
- Pin Gao
(School of Data Science, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518172, China)
- Ying-Ju Chen
(School of Business and Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong)
Abstract
Problem definition : The loyalty penalty refers to a pricing strategy where companies charge higher prices to loyal customers for exploitation while offering lower prices to nonloyal customers for attraction. To address this unfair business practice, various regulatory agencies, such as the Competition and Markets Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom, have proposed or implemented regulations aimed at promoting fairness in pricing. In this study, we analyze the impact of such regulations on both firms and consumers. Methodology/results : We develop a stylized model to investigate duopoly competition in two symmetric markets, where consumers exhibit loyalty to different firms in each market. The regulatory intervention mandates that the price difference between the two markets, set by each firm, must not exceed a certain threshold. Our analysis reveals an intriguing interaction between market competition and price fairness regulation. When competition is intense, fairness regulation can alleviate cutthroat competition between firms, resulting in Pareto improvements compared with a scenario with no regulation. On the other hand, when competition is weak, fairness regulation can further enhance firms’ existing monopoly power, potentially leading to collusive high prices that are detrimental to consumers and society. We also consider several extensions to enrich our findings, including fairness regulation on relative price discounts, asymmetric markets, and a two-pronged policy regulating the price gap and price cap. Managerial implications : Our study reveals the economic consequences of price fairness regulations; firms can benefit by pricing fairly, but well-intended fairness requirements may have adverse effects on consumers.
Suggested Citation
Zongsen Yang & Xingyu Fu & Pin Gao & Ying-Ju Chen, 2024.
"Fairness Regulation of Prices in Competitive Markets,"
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 26(5), pages 1897-1917, September.
Handle:
RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:26:y:2024:i:5:p:1897-1917
DOI: 10.1287/msom.2022.0552
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