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Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Different Priority Rules: The Role of Information

Author

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  • Mengling Li

    (MOE Key Laboratory of Econometrics, Department of Economics, School of Economics, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Fujian Key Laboratory of Statistics, Xiamen University, Fujian 361005, China)

  • Yohanes E. Riyanto

    (Division of Economics, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639818, Singapore)

Abstract

This paper examines the incentive to register for deceased organ donation under alternative organ allocation priority rules, which may prioritize registered donors and/or patients with higher valuations for organ transplantation. Specifically, the donor priority rule grants higher priority on the organ waiting list to those who have previously registered as donors. The dual-incentive priority rules allocate organs based on donor status, followed by individual valuations within the same donor status, or vice versa. Both theoretical and experimental results suggest that the efficacy of the donor priority rule and the dual-incentive priority rules critically depends on the information environment. When organ transplantation valuations are unobservable prior to making donation decisions, the hybrid dual-incentive rules generate higher donation rates. In contrast, if valuations are observable, the dual-incentive priority rules create unbalanced incentives between high- and low-value agents, potentially undermining the efficacy of the hybrid dual-incentive rules in increasing overall donation rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Mengling Li & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2025. "Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Different Priority Rules: The Role of Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(2), pages 1418-1437, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:2:p:1418-1437
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.01530
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