Author
Listed:
- Fabian Gaessler
(Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08002 Barcelona, Spain; and UPF Barcelona School of Management, 08008 Barcelona, Spain; and Barcelona School of Economics, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 80539 Munich, Germany)
- Dietmar Harhoff
(Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 80539 Munich, Germany; and Munich School of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, 80539 Munich, Germany; and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London EC1V 0DX, United Kingdom)
- Stefan Sorg
(Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 80539 Munich, Germany)
- Georg von Graevenitz
(School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London E1 4NS, United Kingdom)
Abstract
We study the blocking effect of patents on follow-on innovation by others. We posit that follow-on innovation requires freedom to operate (FTO), which firms typically obtain through a license from the patentee holding the original innovation. Where licensing fails, follow-on innovation is blocked unless firms gain FTO through patent invalidation. Using large-scale data from post-grant oppositions at the European Patent Office, we find that patent invalidation increases follow-on innovation, measured in citations, by 16% on average. This effect exhibits a U-shape in the value of the original innovation. For patents on low-value original innovations, invalidation predominantly increases low-value follow-on innovation outside the patentee’s product market. Here, transaction costs likely exceed the joint surplus of licensing, causing licensing failure. In contrast, for patents on high-value original innovations, invalidation mainly increases high-value follow-on innovation in the patentee’s product market. We attribute this latter result to rent dissipation, which renders patentees unwilling to license out valuable technologies to (potential) competitors.
Suggested Citation
Fabian Gaessler & Dietmar Harhoff & Stefan Sorg & Georg von Graevenitz, 2025.
"Patents, Freedom to Operate, and Follow-on Innovation: Evidence from Post-Grant Opposition,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(2), pages 1315-1334, February.
Handle:
RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:2:p:1315-1334
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.02294
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:71:y:2025:i:2:p:1315-1334. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.