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Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Vijay Mohan

    (Blockchain Innovation Hub, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia; Lattice Analytics Pty Ltd, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia)

  • Peyman Khezr

    (School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia)

  • Chris Berg

    (Blockchain Innovation Hub, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of time commitment as a voting resource for decentralized governance when the identity of voters cannot be verified. In order to do so, we take a closer look at two issues that confront token-based voting systems used by blockchain communities and organizations: voter fraud through the creation of multiple identities (Sybil attack) and concentration of voting power in the hands of the wealthy (plutocracy). Our contribution is threefold: first, we lay analytical foundations for the formal modeling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that tokens as the only instrument for weighting votes cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and a plutocracy in the voting process; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument (time commitment) that is effective for countering plutocracy when large token holders also have a relatively high opportunity cost of locking tokens for a vote. Overall, our paper emphasizes the importance of time-based suffrage in decentralized governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Vijay Mohan & Peyman Khezr & Chris Berg, 2024. "Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(12), pages 8709-8734, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:70:y:2024:i:12:p:8709-8734
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536
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