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Managing Relationships Between Restaurants and Food Delivery Platforms: Conflict, Contracts, and Coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Pnina Feldman

    (Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215)

  • Andrew E. Frazelle

    (Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080)

  • Robert Swinney

    (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708)

Abstract

Restaurant delivery platforms collect customer orders via the Internet, transmit them to restaurants, and deliver the orders to customers. They provide value to restaurants by expanding their markets, but critics claim they destroy restaurant profits by taking a percentage of revenues and generating congestion that negatively impacts dine-in customers. We consider these tensions using a model of a restaurant as a congested service system. We find that the predominant industry contract, in which the platform takes a percentage cut of each delivery order (a “commission”), fails to coordinate the system because the platform does not internalize its effect on dine-in revenues; this leads to prices that are too low, reducing the restaurant’s margins and leaving money on the table for both firms. Two commonly proposed remedies to this problem (commission caps and allowing the restaurant to set a price floor on the platform) can increase restaurant revenue but do not solve the coordination issue. We thus propose an alternative, practical coordinating contract that is a variation of the current industry standard: for each delivery order, the platform pays the restaurant a percentage revenue share and a fixed fee. We show that this contract, appropriately designed, coordinates the system, protects restaurant margins by ensuring a lower bound on its revenue per delivery order, and allocates revenue between the restaurant and the platform with a high degree of flexibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Pnina Feldman & Andrew E. Frazelle & Robert Swinney, 2023. "Managing Relationships Between Restaurants and Food Delivery Platforms: Conflict, Contracts, and Coordination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 812-823, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:2:p:812-823
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4390
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cai, Gangshu (George), 2010. "Channel Selection and Coordination in Dual-Channel Supply Chains," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 22-36.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuo, Chia-Wei & Xiong, Hui & Chen, Ying-Ju & Chang, Ting-Kai & Wu, Shining & Chang, Yung-Hsun, 2024. "Vertical product line extension when online retailers serve as mom-and-pop stores’ suppliers," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Perez Becker, Nicole & Arts, Joachim & Reichardt, Sven & Lange, Anne, 2024. "Managing inventories of reusable containers for food take-away at a restaurant," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 267(C).
    3. Ma, Shigui & He, Yong & Gu, Ran & Yeh, Chung-Hsing, 2024. "How to cooperate in a three-tier food delivery service supply chain," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    4. Jo, Hanseul & Shin, Jungwoo, 2024. "Evidence-based equilibrium analysis of two-sided market in food delivery industry," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    5. Sun, Ke, 2024. "Strategic responses to the aggregator platform: Pricing and information sharing," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

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