IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v32y1986i9p1087-1094.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Model for the Distribution of the Number of Bids on Federal Offshore Oil Leases

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820)

  • Elmer L. Dougherty

    (Department of Petroleum Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089)

  • John Lohrenz

    (Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Company, Houston, Texas 77252)

Abstract

Not all Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) federal oil leases receive the same number of bids. Indeed, while some leases receive over a dozen bids, many others receive no bids at all. This leads to uncertainty in the number of bids a lease will receive---uncertainty of potential concern to both bidders and bid takers. We develop a model that suggest there are three fundamentally different types of leases---those with "no," "low," and "high" competition. This provides a basis for bidders and bid takers to explicitly account for some of the differences among leases when preparing bids and when evaluating the bidding. Although we specifically study only OCS federal oil leases, our overall approach and insights should apply equally well to many other situations with uncertain numbers of bids, including mineral leasing in general, as well as military procurement and construction contracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Elmer L. Dougherty & John Lohrenz, 1986. "A Model for the Distribution of the Number of Bids on Federal Offshore Oil Leases," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(9), pages 1087-1094, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:32:y:1986:i:9:p:1087-1094
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.32.9.1087
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.9.1087
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.32.9.1087?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aleksandar Saša Pekev{c} & Ilia Tsetlin, 2008. "Revenue Ranking of Discriminatory and Uniform Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(9), pages 1610-1623, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:32:y:1986:i:9:p:1087-1094. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.