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A Note on Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael Rob

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104)

Abstract

This note reexamines a problem of competitive bidding under asymmetrical information about the value of the object which was originally formulated and studied by R. Wilson (Wilson, R. B. 1967. Competitive bidding with asymmetric information. Management Sci. 13 816--820.). We analyze the Stackelberg equilibria of the game under alternative behavioral assumptions about the sequencing of moves. The relative gains of the seller and the two buyers are computed for specific numerical examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Rob, 1985. "A Note on Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(11), pages 1431-1439, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:31:y:1985:i:11:p:1431-1439
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.31.11.1431
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    Cited by:

    1. Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 338, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-007 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided certification: The market for rating agencies," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-007, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.

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