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An Investigation of the Equal Commission Rate Policy for a Multi-Product Salesforce

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  • V. Srinivasan

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

For a multi-product sales force, the policy of paying commissions as an equal percentage of realized gross margins is shown to be in general, nonoptimal from the firm's profit maximization point of view. For a homogeneous salesforce, the nonoptimality results from the fact that earlier research while taking into account the effect of commission rates on a salesperson's allocations of total time to the multiple products, has not incorporated the effect of commission rates on salesperson's total selling time (resulting from his/her trading off income vs. total time to maximize utility). The equal commission rate policy is, however, optimal for the cases of (i) salesperson with a fixed total selling time and a minimum income requirement and (ii) "fair-income" salesperson whose total selling time is merely a function of income (and not based on rate of change of income as in the utility maximization case). If the salesforce is heterogeneous (e.g., different salespersons have differing sales responses to selling time) this makes the equal commission rate policy to be, in general, nonoptimal even for the restrictive cases (i) and (ii). It is suggested that the commission rates be set higher for products with greater elasticities (relating quantities sold to selling times). The common practice of paying commissions as a percentage of total dollar sales (rather than gross margins) is shown to be optimal under certain assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • V. Srinivasan, 1981. "An Investigation of the Equal Commission Rate Policy for a Multi-Product Salesforce," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(7), pages 731-756, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:27:y:1981:i:7:p:731-756
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.27.7.731
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    Cited by:

    1. Bicheng Yang & Tat Chan & Raphael Thomadsen, 2019. "A Salesforce-Driven Model of Consumer Choice," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 871-887, September.
    2. Purohit, Devavrat, 1995. "Marketing Channels and the Durable Goods Monopolist: Renting versus Selling Reconsidered," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 69-84, Spring.
    3. Fabio Caldieraro & Anne T. Coughlan, 2007. "Spiffed-Up Channels: The Role of Spiffs in Hierarchical Selling Organizations," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(1), pages 31-51, 01-02.
    4. Lee, Chung-Yee & Yang, Ruina, 2013. "Compensation plan for competing salespersons under asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 227(3), pages 570-580.
    5. Abel P. Jeuland & Steven M. Shugan, 2008. "Managing Channel Profits," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(1), pages 52-69, 01-02.
    6. Sijun Wang & Yuanjie He, 2008. "Compensating Nondedicated Cross-Functional Teams," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(5), pages 753-765, October.
    7. Fangruo Chen, 2000. "Sales-Force Incentives and Inventory Management," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 2(2), pages 186-202, February.
    8. Albers, Sonke, 1996. "Optimization models for salesforce compensation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 1-17, February.
    9. Zeng, Xiaohua & Dasgupta, Srabana & Weinberg, Charles B., 2014. "The effects of a “no-haggle” channel on marketing strategies," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 434-443.

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    Keywords

    marketing; marketing: sales force;

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