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Aspects of One-Stage Voting Rules

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  • Peter C. Fishburn

    (Pennsylvania State University)

Abstract

Under the assumption that voters have linear preference orders, this study investigates the propensity of simple weighted scoring rules to yield a winning alternative which is the same as the alternative (if any) which would win using a norm rule such as the simple-majority rule or the Borda rule. The scoring rules examined are of the types implemented by ballot instructions such as "vote for two of the following seven alternatives" and "indicate your first (1), second (2), and third (3) choices from the following list of ten candidates." The results, which apply only to situations where one of a number of alternatives is to be chosen on the basis of a single ballot, may be useful in designing balloting and scoring procedures for these types of situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter C. Fishburn, 1974. "Aspects of One-Stage Voting Rules," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(4), pages 422-427, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:21:y:1974:i:4:p:422-427
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.21.4.422
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. Lirong Xia, 2021. "Semi-Random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion," Papers 2107.06435, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    3. Robert Bordley, 1985. "A precise method for evaluating election schemes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 113-123, January.
    4. Lirong Xia, 2021. "The Smoothed Satisfaction of Voting Axioms," Papers 2106.01947, arXiv.org.

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