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Free-Access Policy for Internal Networks

Author

Listed:
  • P. S. Giridharan

    (Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213)

  • Haim Mendelson

    (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-5015)

Abstract

This paper evaluates the free-access policy as a control mechanism for internal networks. We derive the optimal message pricing scheme, compare it to the free-access policy, and study the associated net-value loss. We derive uniform upper bounds on this value loss, and apply our results to the polar implementations of ethernet and token ring networks. The results show that the free-access policy is often attractive.

Suggested Citation

  • P. S. Giridharan & Haim Mendelson, 1994. "Free-Access Policy for Internal Networks," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 5(1), pages 1-22, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:orisre:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:1-22
    DOI: 10.1287/isre.5.1.1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raja Nadiminti & Tridas Mukhopadhyay & Charles H. Kriebel, 2002. "Research Report: Intrafirm Resource Allocation with Asymmetric Information and Negative Externalities," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 13(4), pages 428-434, December.
    2. Prabhudev Konana & Alok Gupta & Andrew B. Whinston, 2000. "Integrating User Preferences and Real-Time Workload in Information Services," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 11(2), pages 177-196, June.
    3. Erica L. Plambeck & Qiong Wang, 2013. "Implications of Hyperbolic Discounting for Optimal Pricing and Scheduling of Unpleasant Services That Generate Future Benefits," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1927-1946, August.

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