IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/imx/journl/v17y2022i2a7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Analysis of Optimal Tax Revenue Sharing for Mexico

Author

Listed:
  • Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez

    (Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, México)

  • Benito Alan Ponce Rodriguez

    (Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, México)

Abstract

Se desarrolla un análisis que identifica las características de un sistema óptimo de recaudación tributaria compartida y transferencias intergubernamentales. Se utiliza la técnica de optimización para encontrar el nivel de impuestos y transferencias intergubernamentales. Se caracterizan fórmulas para el nivel óptimo de impuestos y transferencias a gobiernos subnacionales. Reformar las participaciones al incluir los costos de ineficiencia de los impuestos, algunas normas de transferencias de ecualización fiscal, y los beneficios sociales marginales del gasto público local. Para futuras investigaciones se podrían incluir el gasto público local con externalidades regionales, la migración, y considerar un modelo dinámico. Este artículo propone un modelo teórico original de coordinación de impuestos y transferencias óptimas. Se identifican el nivel óptimo de impuestos y transferencias. Este trabajo propone reformas a la fórmula de participaciones a gobiernos subnacionales.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez & Benito Alan Ponce Rodriguez, 2022. "An Analysis of Optimal Tax Revenue Sharing for Mexico," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 17(2), pages 1-20, Abril - J.
    • Handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:17:y:2022:i:2:a:7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.remef.org.mx/index.php/remef/article/view/523
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abbott, Andrew & Cabral, René & Jones, Philip & Palacios, Roberto, 2015. "Political pressure and procyclical expenditure: An analysis of the expenditures of state governments in Mexico," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 195-206.
    2. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    3. Johnson, William R, 1988. "Income Redistribution in a Federal System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 570-573, June.
    4. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
    5. Devereux, M.P. & Lockwood, B. & Redoano, M., 2007. "Horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition: Theory and some evidence from the USA," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 451-479, April.
    6. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Agnese Sacchi, 2017. "The Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1095-1129, September.
    7. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(2), pages 137-155, May.
    8. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Crivelli, Ernesto & Volpe Martincus, Christian, 2007. "Horizontal and Vertical Tax Externalities in a Multicountry World," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2012. "Reassessment of the Tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1063-1078.
    3. Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez & Juan Medina Guirado, 2018. "Fiscal Institutions and the Size and Inter-Regional Distribution of Public Redistribution. (Instituciones Fiscales y el Tamaño y Distribución Inter-Regional de la Redistribución Pública)," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(1), pages 1-42, May.
    4. Sotiris Karkalakos & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2007. "A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(3), pages 782-811, August.
    5. Perez-Sebastian, Fidel & Raveh, Ohad, 2018. "What drives vertical fiscal interactions? Evidence from the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 251-268.
    6. Esteller-More, Alex & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2001. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 247-272, April.
    7. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, April.
    8. Hoyt, William H., 2001. "Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 491-516, November.
    9. Sylvie Charlot & Sonia Paty & Virginie Piguet, 2015. "Does Fiscal Cooperation Increase Local Tax Rates in Urban Areas?," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(10), pages 1706-1721, October.
    10. Luiz de Mello, 2007. "The Brazilian 'Tax War': The Case of Value-Added Tax Competition among the States," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 544, OECD Publishing.
    11. Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2024. "On the effects of intergovernmental grants: a survey," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(3), pages 856-908, June.
    12. Luiz de Mello, 2008. "The Brazilian ``Tax War''," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(2), pages 169-193, March.
    13. Florence TOUYA, 2009. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working Papers 9, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Nov 2009.
    14. Matthieu Leprince & Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty, 2007. "Business Tax Interactions Among Local Governments: An Empirical Analysis Of The French Case," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 603-621, August.
    15. Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2002. "Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(3), pages 235-257, May.
    16. Robin Boadway, 2001. "Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 93-121, June.
    17. Florence TOUYA, 2013. "Tax Interactions with Asymmetric Information and Nonlinear Instruments," Working Papers 2012-2013_9, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Jul 2013.
    18. Florence TOUYA, 2016. "Horizontal and Vertical Tax Interactions in a Common Agency Game," Working Papers 2015-2016_12, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Aug 2016.
    19. William F. Fox & Brian C. Hill & Matthew N. Murray, 2015. "Vertical Competition, Horizontal Competition, and Mobile Capital," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(4), pages 431-457, July.
    20. Braid, Ralph M., 2013. "State and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 57-67.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax revenue sharing; optimal taxation; state and local expenditures; fiscal federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:17:y:2022:i:2:a:7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ricardo Mendoza (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.remef.org.mx/index.php/remef/index .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.