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Are Basel's Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Banks Too Small?

Author

Listed:
  • Wayne Passmore

    (Federal Reserve Board)

  • Alexander H. von Hafften

    (Federal Reserve Board)

Abstract

The Basel Committee promulgates bank regulatory standards, including capital surcharges for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Our analysis suggests that the Basel III capital surcharge framework underestimates the probability of bank failure, wrongly disregards short-term funding, and excludes too many banks; our baseline estimate suggests surcharges should increase 3.00 to 8.25 percentage points and that even higher surcharges should apply to G-SIBs that rely on short-term funding. Our findings, which do not account for Basel III beyond the capital surcharges, may differ from the findings of a comprehensive analysis of Basel III.

Suggested Citation

  • Wayne Passmore & Alexander H. von Hafften, 2019. "Are Basel's Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Banks Too Small?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 15(1), pages 107-156, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2019:q:1:a:3
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tirupam Goel & Ulf Lewrick & Aakriti Mathur, 2021. "Does regulation only bite the less profitable? Evidence from the too-big-to-fail reforms," BIS Working Papers 922, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Benoit, Sylvain, 2024. "Smart systemic-risk scores," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    3. Alexander Jiron & Wayne Passmore & Aurite Werman, 2021. "An empirical foundation for calibrating the G-SIB surcharge," BIS Working Papers 935, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Favara, Giovanni & Ivanov, Ivan & Rezende, Marcelo, 2021. "GSIB surcharges and bank lending: Evidence from US corporate loan data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(3), pages 1426-1443.
    5. Leo Haan & Jan Kakes, 0. "European banks after the global financial crisis: peak accumulated losses, twin crises and business models," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 0, pages 1-15.
    6. Marwan Alzoubi & Ayman Abdalmajeed Alsmadi & Hamad kasasbeh, 2022. "Systemically Important Bank: A Bibliometric Analysis for the Period of 2002 to 2022," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(4), pages 21582440221, December.
    7. Degryse, Hans & Mariathasan, Mike & Tang, Hien T., 2023. "GSIB status and corporate lending," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    8. Michael Sigmund, 2022. "The capital buffer calibration for other systemically important institutions‐Is the country heterogeneity in the EU caused by regulatory capture?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(5), pages 533-563, November.
    9. Dimitrov, Daniel & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2023. "Macroprudential Regulation: A Risk Management Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 17846, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Leo Haan & Jan Kakes, 2020. "European banks after the global financial crisis: peak accumulated losses, twin crises and business models," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 197-211, September.
    11. Busch, Pascal & Cappelletti, Giuseppe & Marincas, Vlad & Meller, Barbara & Wildmann, Nadya, 2021. "How useful is market information for the identification of G-SIBs?," Occasional Paper Series 260, European Central Bank.
    12. Michael Sigmund, 2020. "The Capital Buffer Calibration for Other Systemically Important Institutions – Is the Country Heterogeneity in the EU caused by Regulatory Capture? (Michael Sigmund)," Working Papers 232, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    13. Luis Garcia & Ulf Lewrick & Taja Sečnik, 2021. "Is window dressing by banks systemically important?," BIS Working Papers 960, Bank for International Settlements.
    14. Tirupam Goel & Ulf Lewrick & Aakriti Mathur, 2019. "Playing it safe: global systemically important banks after the crisis," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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