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Revising the Equation: Partisan Bias and Economic Voting Hypothesis in the Turkish Context

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  • Emre ERDOĞAN

    (Infakto RW/İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi)

Abstract

Economic voting theory is one of the most powerful explanations of voting behavior of ordinary citizens and it’s almost a part of democratic practice. This approach is heavily used in the Turkish context and models based on this model are very successful in estimating election results. However, there are some “revisionist” objections to basic premises of the economic voting approach. According to this approach, economic evaluations of voters are highly affected by their partisan affiliations, leading to a vicious cycle. This paper presents findings of a field research conducted in Istanbul, prior to the general elections of 2011 and aims to present how much economic perceptions of Turkish voters are biased. Findings show that economic evaluations of voters are highly biased and affected by their partisan affiliations.

Suggested Citation

  • Emre ERDOĞAN, 2013. "Revising the Equation: Partisan Bias and Economic Voting Hypothesis in the Turkish Context," Iktisat Isletme ve Finans, Bilgesel Yayincilik, vol. 28(325), pages 27-60.
    • Handle: RePEc:iif:iifjrn:v:28:y:2013:i:325:p:27-60
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting Behavior; Economic Voting; Partisan Bias; Uncertainty; Voter Preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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