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Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, And Unobservable Technology

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  • Kaz Miyagiwa

Abstract

Consumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured. I examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporter's technology choice. Even when its technology choice is unobservable, boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer. Import policy can augment this effect, but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand, a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result. Specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect, but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers' concern. Copyright © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaz Miyagiwa, 2009. "Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, And Unobservable Technology," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 883-902, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:50:y:2009:i:3:p:883-902
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    Cited by:

    1. Kasaundra M. Tomlin, 2019. "Assessing the Efficacy of Consumer Boycotts of U.S. Target Firms: A Shareholder Wealth Analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 503-529, October.
    2. Tomomichi Mizuno & Kazuhiro Takauchi & Takeshi Iida, 2011. "Better technology may be sold for a lower fee: The ad valorem tariff and licensing contract," Discussion Papers 1109, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.

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