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Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Boadway

    (Queen's University, Canada)

  • Katherine Cuff

    (McMaster University, Canada)

  • Nicolas Marceau

    (UniversitÈ du QuÈbec ý MontrÈal, Canada)

Abstract

Regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs. The redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled, who cannot work. Able individuals may work, be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market, or choose to be voluntary unemployed. Labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies. Both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore, firms' location decisions. Allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient. If regions cannot tax firms, they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2002. "Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 761-782, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:3:p:761-782
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2004. "Agglomeration Effects and the Competition for Firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(5), pages 623-645, September.
    2. Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2011. "Optimal tax policy when firms are internationally mobile," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(5), pages 580-604, October.
    3. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
    4. Marceau, Nicolas, 2008. "La concurrence entre gouvernements est-elle bénéfique?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 84(4), pages 365-390, Décembre.
    5. Myrna Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2003. "Hotelling Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 932, CESifo.
    6. Sangwha Shin & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2022. "Tax Competition under Imperfect Labor Market," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 38, pages 141-166.
    7. Boadway, Robin & Cuff, Katherine & Marceau, Nicolas, 2003. "Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2407-2430, October.
    8. MORITA Tadashi & SAWADA Yukiko & YAMAMOTO Kazuhiro, 2016. "Subsidy Competition, Imperfect Labor Market, and Endogenous Entry of Firms," Discussion papers 16096, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    9. Hikaru Ogawa & Yasuhiro Sato & Toshiki Tamai, 2016. "Who gains from capital market integration? Tax competition between unionized and non-unionized countries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 76-110, February.
    10. Silvia Rocha‐Akis & Ronnie Schöb, 2011. "Welfare Policy in the Presence of Unionised Labour and Internationally Mobile Firms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(1), pages 93-119, March.
    11. Lenka GREGOROVA & Martin GREGOR, 2010. "Jurisdictional Competition via Spending Composition: The Case of the Czech Republic," Regional and Urban Modeling 284100016, EcoMod.
    12. Ogawa, Hikaru & Sato, Yasuhiro & Tamai, Toshiki, 2006. "A note on unemployment and capital tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 350-356, September.
    13. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1105-1121, June.
    14. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 737, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    15. C. Dembour, 2008. "Competition for Business Location: A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 89-111, June.
    16. Kangoh Lee, 2021. "Labor market frictions, capital, taxes and employment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(6), pages 1329-1359, December.
    17. Robin Boadway, 2001. "Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 93-121, June.
    18. Jun Oshiro, 2011. "Tariff Policy and Transport Costs under Reciprocal Dumping," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.

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