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Induced Preferences, Nonadditive Beliefs, and Multiple Priors

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  • Kelsey, David
  • Milne, Frank

Abstract

We study a decision maker who follows the Savage axioms. We show that if he or she is able to take unobservable actions that influence the probabilities of outcomes, then it can appear to an outsider as if his or her subjective probabilities are nonadditive. Implications for multiperiod decision are explored. We extend the model to include a second individual who is also able to take a hidden action. We show that this may induce uncertainty-averse preferences over some class of acts, even if the second individual acts to help the decision maker with high probability. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1999. "Induced Preferences, Nonadditive Beliefs, and Multiple Priors," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(2), pages 455-477, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:2:p:455-77
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    Cited by:

    1. Ralph W. Bailey & Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2005. "Ambiguity and Public Good Provision in Large Societies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(5), pages 741-759, December.
    2. Spanjers, Willy, 2008. "Central banks and ambiguity," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 85-102.
    3. Machina, Mark J, 2001. "Payoff Kinks in Preferences over Lotteries," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-260, November.
    4. Chen, Zengjing & Epstein, Larry G. & Zhang, Guodong, 2023. "A central limit theorem, loss aversion and multi-armed bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    5. Frank Milne & Edwin H. Neave, 2003. "A General Equilibrium Financial Asset Economy With Transaction Costs And Trading Constraints," Working Paper 1082, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    6. Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon & Kelsey, David, 2005. "CEU preferences and dynamic consistency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 143-151, March.

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