Author
Listed:
- Marco Biagetti
(Agency for Territorial Cohesion, Unit of Econometrics, Statistics and Territorial Public Accounts. Italian Government (Roma, Italia))
Abstract
In this paper I first review the main points of the European crisis, showing that the credibility of a time-infinite fixed exchange rate, together with the free movement of capitals in the EU determined overconfidence, an excessive fall in interest rates, and overborrowing that made the system collapse when the external?originated crisis struck, damaging public finances as the banking system had to be rescued by governments. Secondly, I scrutinize an apparent success story of austerity-linked recovery from the crisis: Ireland. I outline that the outgoing government in 2010 acted well in the midst of the financial crisis, regardless of the effectiveness and desirability of the austerity measures. But I also collect facts and figures evidencing that what appears to be a true recovery is only being obtained by means of some unavoidable accounting tricks depending on a new mandatory national accounting EU rule about the treatment of investments. Unfortunately all this produces inflated figures for the GDP and GNP, while the standards of living of Irish citizens continue to fall behind. / En este artículo en primer lugar examino los puntos principales de la crisis de la eurozona (UME), mostrando que la credibilidad de un tipo de cambio fijo, junto con la libre circulación de capitales en la UME determinó un exceso de confianza, una caída excesiva de las tasas de interés y superabudancia en la demanda de prestamos, lo que hizo colapsar el sistema cuando se produjo la nombrada crisis la cual tuvo origen en el exterior de la zona. Esa crisis dañó las finanzas públicas, pues que el sistema bancario tuvo que ser rescatado por los gobiernos. En segundo lugar, analizo una aparente historia de éxito de la recuperación de la crisis que parece debida a la austeridad: la de Irlanda. Resalto que el gobierno irlandés saliente en 2010 actuó bien en el medio de la crisis financiera, a pesar de la eficacia y conveniencia de las medidas de austeridad. Pero también recojo hechos y cifras sobre lo que sólo aparentemente parece ser una verdadera recuperación y que sin embargo se obtuvo mediante algunos trucos de contabilidad inevitables y dependientes de una nueva normativa obligatoria de contabilidad nacional tomada a nivel de la UE y relativa al tratamiento de las inversiones. Desafortunadamente todo esto produjo y todavía produce cifras infladas para el PIB y el PNB, mientras que los estándares de vida de los ciudadanos irlandeses siguen siendo no muy afectados.
Suggested Citation
Marco Biagetti, 2016.
"The European Crisis and the Myth of the Irish Recovery: an Insight,"
Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 54(1), pages 123-145, Diciembre.
Handle:
RePEc:ief:reveye:v:54:y:2016:i:1:p:123-145
DOI: 10.55444/2451.7321.2016.v54.n1.19431
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