IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/iec/inveco/v33y2009i1p39-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Foreign monopoly and self-enforcing tariff agreements under integrated markets: Prices versus quantities

Author

Listed:
  • M. Dolores Alepuz

    (University of Valencia)

  • Santiago J. Rubio

    (University of Valencia)

Abstract

This paper studies the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market. The tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement, and in the second stage the signatories choose cooperatively their tariffs whereas the non-signatories and the monopoly act in a non-cooperative way. Our findings show that the agreement consists of three countries regardless of whether the monopolist chooses the quantity or the price and the number of importers, provided that the parties to the agreement act as a leader in the second stage of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Dolores Alepuz & Santiago J. Rubio, 2009. "Foreign monopoly and self-enforcing tariff agreements under integrated markets: Prices versus quantities," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 33(1), pages 39-68, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:39-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.fundacionsepi.es/investigacion/revistas/paperArchive/Ene2009/v33i1a2.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Santiago Rubio, 2011. "On Capturing Rent from a Non-renewable Resource International Monopoly: Prices Versus Quantities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 558-580, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-enforcing tariff agreements; integrated markets; rent-shifting hypothesis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:39-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Isabel Sánchez-Seco (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.fundacionsepi.es/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.