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El poder de veto de la gran coalición

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Hervés-Beloso

    (Universidad de Vigo)

  • Emma Moreno-García

    (Universidad de Salamanca)

Abstract

En este artículo se obtienen dos caracterizaciones de las asignaciones de equilibrio walrasiano en economías de intercambio con un número finito de consumidores. Ambas caracterizaciones se establecen en términos del poder de veto de la "gran coalición", formada por todos los agentes de la economía. En un primer resultado probamos que una asignación es de equilibrio si y sólo si no está dominada por la "gran coalición" en cualquiera de las economías que resultan de alterar las dotaciones iniciales, tan poco como se quiera, en una dirección precisa. Nuestro segundo resultado de equivalencia establece que cualquier asignación no walrasiana está vetada por la "gran coalición" en la que todos los individuos participan con recursos arbitrariamente próximos a sus dotaciones iniciales. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García, 2004. "El poder de veto de la gran coalición," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 28(3), pages 489-513, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:28:y:2004:i:3:p:489-513
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrio walrasiano; gran coalición; veto de Aubin; núcleo de Aubin; asignaciones dominadas.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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