IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ids/ijsuse/v4y2012i1p89-110.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transparency as an instrument for improved efficiency and legitimacy of the public sector: a case of scientific research

Author

Listed:
  • Mojca Kastelc Selan
  • Franci DemÅ¡ar

Abstract

This paper discusses transparency as an instrument with the potential to improve efficiency and legitimacy in the public sector. In this paper, elements of transparency in administration of scientific research in Slovenia by Slovenian Research Agency are taken under consideration. Responses of researchers and directors of research organisations are analysed regarding agency internet site with the data on published rules, schedules of all public calls, the results of research work, the results of public calls and financial data. Data show that transparency of a public institution has a positive effect on sustainable efficiency in the area of work of the public institution and improves perception of the system’s legitimacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mojca Kastelc Selan & Franci DemÅ¡ar, 2012. "Transparency as an instrument for improved efficiency and legitimacy of the public sector: a case of scientific research," International Journal of Sustainable Economy, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 4(1), pages 89-110.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:ijsuse:v:4:y:2012:i:1:p:89-110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.inderscience.com/link.php?id=43997
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    2. Fung,Archon & Graham,Mary & Weil,David, 2007. "Full Disclosure," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876179, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jacques Crémer, 2010. "Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 377-387, 04-05.
    2. V. Bhaskar & Caroline Thomas, 2019. "The Culture of Overconfidence," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 95-110, June.
    3. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    4. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
    5. Michael Raith, 2008. "Specific knowledge and performance measurement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1059-1079, December.
    6. Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The Social Value of Transparency and Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Asymmetric Public Good Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2011. "The Benefits of Aggregate Performance Metrics in the Presence of Career Concerns," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(8), pages 1424-1437, August.
    8. Clemens A. Otto & Paolo F. Volpin, 2018. "Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3756-3771, August.
    9. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    10. Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September.
    11. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
    12. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
    13. Izzo, Federica & Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Cumulative knowledge in the social sciences: The case of improving voters' information," MPRA Paper 112559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Christine Benesch & Monika Bütler & Katharina Hofer, 2019. "Who Benefits from More Transparency in Parliamentary Voting?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(01), pages 36-41, May.
    15. Garcia-Martinez, Jose A., 2013. "The Perverse Incentive of Knowing the Truth," MPRA Paper 43825, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Ruth Carlitz, 2013. "Improving Transparency and Accountability in the Budget Process: An Assessment of Recent Initiatives," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 31, pages 49-67, July.
    17. von Essen, Emma & Jansson, Joakim, 2020. "Misogynistic and Xenophobic Hate Language Online: A Matter of Anonymity," Working Paper Series 1350, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    18. Ahnert, Toni & Bertsch, Christoph, 2013. "A wake-up call: information contagion and strategic uncertainty," Working Paper Series 282, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), revised 01 Mar 2014.
    19. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2012. "When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-16.
    20. Alessandra Bonfiglioli & Gino Gancia, 2013. "Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0, pages 373-400, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijsuse:v:4:y:2012:i:1:p:89-110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sarah Parker (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=301 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.