A comparative analysis of greening policies and CSR efforts in a government-led sustainable supply chain across different channel powers

This article considers a government-led sustainable supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under selling price, greening level and CSR effort dependent market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer are responsible for product greening and CSR, respectively. To stimulate product greening and CSR effort, the government subsidises both of them. The optimal decisions are obtained both analytically and numerically under four game-theoretic policies viz. centralised policy (model C), manufacturer-led decentralised policy (model M), retailer-led decentralised policy (model R) and Nash game (model N). Three special cases are examined by considering that the manufacturer does not produce green products, the retailer does not give any effort in CSR, and both of them do not provide any effort. Our results show that model N provides comparatively better outcome, and each member prefers to lead the channel as it helps to gain higher profit.