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Two-echelon supply chain coordination with advertising-driven demand under Stackelberg game policy

Author

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  • Jiseong Noh
  • Jong Soo Kim
  • Biswajit Sarkar

Abstract

This paper develops a two-echelon supply chain model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, where the demand is sensitive to advertising and retail price. To resolve the supply chain coordination, three strategies are introduced as retailer leader-manufacturer follower, manufacturer leader-retailer follower, and centralised supply chain. Based on these strategies, this paper suggests an optimal production rate, a production lot size, shortage level, an advertising expenditure, and retail price. Stackelberg approach is employed for solving leader-follower game to obtain the maximum profit of both manufacturer and retailer. The improved algorithm is developed to obtain the numerical results. For testing the model, this paper considers several numerical experiments, graphical illustrations, and sensitivity analysis. The result shows that the strategy of retailer leader-manufacturer follower obtains the highest profit than other strategies. [Received: 23 September 2017; Revised: 28 November 2017; Revised: 29 April 2018; Revised: 19 July 2018; Revised: 21 October 2018; Accepted: 21 October 2018]

Suggested Citation

  • Jiseong Noh & Jong Soo Kim & Biswajit Sarkar, 2019. "Two-echelon supply chain coordination with advertising-driven demand under Stackelberg game policy," European Journal of Industrial Engineering, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 13(2), pages 213-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:ids:eujine:v:13:y:2019:i:2:p:213-244
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mishra, Mowmita & Ghosh, Santanu Kumar & Sarkar, Biswajit & Sarkar, Mitali & Hota, Soumya Kanti, 2024. "Risk management for barter exchange policy under retail industry," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Jihed Jemai & Biswajit Sarkar, 2019. "Optimum Design of a Transportation Scheme for Healthcare Supply Chain Management: The Effect of Energy Consumption," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(14), pages 1-27, July.
    3. Shaktipada Bhuniya & Biswajit Sarkar & Sarla Pareek, 2019. "Multi-Product Production System with the Reduced Failure Rate and the Optimum Energy Consumption under Variable Demand," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(5), pages 1-20, May.
    4. Xianpei Hong & Xinlu Cao & Yeming Gong & Wanying (amanda) Chen, 2021. "Quality information acquisition and disclosure with green manufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain," Post-Print hal-03188234, HAL.
    5. Hong, Xianpei & Cao, Xinlu & Gong, Yeming & Chen, Wanying, 2021. "Quality information acquisition and disclosure with green manufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
    6. Priyanka & Sarla Pareek, 2023. "A sustainable inventory model for stochastic demand using innovative multi-item production system with reduced failure rate," International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Management, Springer;The Society for Reliability, Engineering Quality and Operations Management (SREQOM),India, and Division of Operation and Maintenance, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden, vol. 14(3), pages 844-864, June.
    7. Xu, Song & Fang, Lei & Govindan, Kannan, 2022. "Energy performance contracting in a supply chain with financially asymmetric manufacturers under carbon tax regulation for climate change mitigation," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Wu, Chengfeng & Liu, Xin & Li, Annan, 2021. "A loss-averse retailer–supplier supply chain model under trade credit in a supplier-Stackelberg game," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 353-365.

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