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Effects Of Insider Shareholding On Corporate Governance In Emerging Markets: Evidence From Taiwan

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  • Te-Kuang Chou

Abstract

Ownership structure is one of the key determinants constituting internal corporate governance, which is especially crucial in emerging markets. This study explores the effects of insider shareholding, an obvious characteristic of ownership structure, on corporate governance. The empirical results demonstrate partial support for the convergence-of-interests argument. This means that a higher insider shareholding structure tends to benefit corporate governance. However, the results also show possible moderating effects from different industrial settings; further studies are needed to deepen the understanding of these effects. Policy implications are provided for legislation and investing in emerging markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Te-Kuang Chou, 2013. "Effects Of Insider Shareholding On Corporate Governance In Emerging Markets: Evidence From Taiwan," Global Journal of Business Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 7(3), pages 47-58.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibf:gjbres:v:7:y:2013:i:3:p:47-58
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Varun Bhandari & Ashima Arora, 2016. "Influence of Shareholders’ Activism and Firm-level Variables on the Corporate Governance Quality in India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 9(2), pages 122-147, December.
    2. Regina M. Lizares, 2022. "Ownership concentration and board structure: Alignment and entrenchment effects in an emerging market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2557-2569, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; ownership structure; insider shareholding; agency theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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