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Imperfect Monitoring in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - A Strategy Tornament

Author

Listed:
  • Anita Ganter

    (University of California, Santa Barbara, USA)

  • Manfred K÷nigstein

    (Humboldt-University, Berlin, Institute for Economic Theory III)

Abstract

Whether Individuals can build up and sustain mutually beneficial cooperation or, more generally, whether they comply with social norms, may depend crucially on the observability of their actions. If these cannot be monitored perfectly, the individual might be tempted to egoistically exploit this situation, or might reduce its cooperativeness because it anticipates exploitative attempts by others. In two strategy tournaments on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect monitoring we systematically varied the degree of observability. We collected "spontaneous strategies" and investigated which types of strategies were successful in each tournament, and whether a higher monitoring level increases or reduces cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Anita Ganter & Manfred K÷nigstein, 2001. "Imperfect Monitoring in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - A Strategy Tornament," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 31-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:31-46
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    Cited by:

    1. Barinova Vera, 2018. "Foreign experience in socially responsible business and feasibility of its implementation in Russia," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 174P, pages 100-100.

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