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The Concept of Open Network Provision in Large Technical Systems

Author

Listed:
  • G³nter Knieps

    (Institute of Transportation Economics and Regional Policy, Albert-Ludwigs-Universitõt, Freiburg, Germany)

Abstract

This paper is a disagreed approach to network regulation is provided. The question is analyzed to what extent interconnection/access problems can be solved by voluntary market contract of the parties involved and to what extent government interventions should be implemented. The key concept is the identification of monopolistic bottlenecks where market power can be identified ex ante. In all other parts of large technical systems regulatory interventions are detrimental. Possible fallacies with respect to regulations of monopolistic bottlenecks (inadequate price-setting rules, extending regulatory basis) are pointed out.

Suggested Citation

  • G³nter Knieps, 1997. "The Concept of Open Network Provision in Large Technical Systems," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 14, pages 357-369.
    • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:14:y:1997:p:357-369
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ces:ifodic:v:3:y:2005:i:4:p:14567573 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Günter Knieps, 2005. "Railway (De-)regulation in Germany," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(04), pages 21-25, January.
    3. Brunekreeft, Gert, 1997. "Local versus global price cap: A comparison of foreclosure incentives," Discussion Papers 36, University of Freiburg, Institute for Transport Economics and Regional Policy.

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