Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

This study explores a supply chain with a capital-constrained startup supplier who invests in product greenness and a manufacturer who sells green products to consumers under demand uncertainty. Green investment of the supplier is supported by the manufacturer with two incentive contracts: (i) investment- and (ii) revenue-sharing contracts. Profit- and survival-seeking objectives are considered for the startup supplier. Results show that the profit-seeking supplier increases its product greenness if demand uncertainty rises, whereas the survival-seeking supplier increases its product greenness if its capital constraints increase. Compared with the commonly used wholesale price contract, investment- and revenue-sharing contracts can help facilitate the “win-win” supply chain cooperation for improving product greenness. If the profit-seeking supplier cooperates with the manufacturer, the investment-sharing contract is preferred as the demand uncertainty increases. If a survival-seeking supplier cooperates with the manufacturer, the revenue-sharing contract is preferred as the capital constraint increases. Overall, the revenue-sharing contract is preferred given the high attractiveness of the green investment. By extending the discussion into two periods, the revenue-sharing contract will be preferred in the survival-seeking case because the cooperation can continue in a large parameter space.