Advertising Cooperation and Green Technology R&D Strategy in a Platform-Led Stackelberg Game

In this paper, we study a platform-led Stackelberg differential game over an infinite planning period considering an industry with two manufacturers competing in a common platform market. One manufacturer invests in R&D and produces green products, and the other produces nongreen products. Three platform advertising strategies are discussed systematically: the platform supports all advertising expenses for both manufacturers (PB), supports only green advertising expenses (PG), and implements a joint advertising plan (PJ) with the green manufacturer. The results reveal that the equilibrium price, R&D effort, and advertising level of products increase as the current green degree increases, while the green degree shows a monotonic trend over time and finally tends to be a stable value. The results also indicate that, in the three models, the green degree and the profits of all players with the PG strategy are the lowest. Compared with the PB strategy, although the PJ strategy may not maximize the profits of all players, from environmental perspective, the strategy would make the alliance achieve the best environmental performance.