Pricing Decision and Financing Approach Selection of Fund-Deficient Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Distributor’s Risk Aversion

The study aims at an issue of the rational financing approach selection on the fund-deficient remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), which is composed of one fund-deficient manufacturer and a risk-adverse distributor. The pricing decision under the cases of manufacturer is with sufficient fund, with limited fund, via debt financing and via equity financing are solved on the CLSC game model. Moreover, the equilibrium solution in different cases is solved using backward induction, analyzing the impact of risk-averse parameters on the equilibrium solution in different cases and obtaining the critical conditions for the manufacturer to execute the optimal financing approach. The conclusion shows that the wholesale price and the retailing price of the new product in debt financing are both greater, while the retailing prices of the remanufacturing product are equal in the two financing approaches. Only when the manufacturer's self-owned fund is constrained and the executable dividend proportion is lower than a critical value, the manufacturer will execute equity financing. However, if the self-owned fund is exceedingly deficient and the executable profit-sharing proportion is adequately large, the manufacturer will prefer debt financing. When executing financing, the consumer surplus declines, while the risk-averse parameter goes up. Debt financing is far eco-friendlier, while equity financing enables both parties and the total revenues of CLSC to attain a multibenefit status in specific circumstances.