IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hin/jnlmpe/1920797.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decentralized Supply Chains under Random Price-Dependent Demand: Noncooperative Equilibria vs. Coordination with Cost-Sharing Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Yanpeng Sun
  • Cheng Ma
  • Qi Sun

Abstract

It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Yanpeng Sun & Cheng Ma & Qi Sun, 2020. "Decentralized Supply Chains under Random Price-Dependent Demand: Noncooperative Equilibria vs. Coordination with Cost-Sharing Contracts," Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-15, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:1920797
    DOI: 10.1155/2020/1920797
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2020/1920797.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2020/1920797.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2020/1920797?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:1920797. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mohamed Abdelhakeem (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.hindawi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.