IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hin/jnlmpe/1049758.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Two-Stage Game-Based Pricing Strategy for the Duopoly Online Freight Platform

Author

Listed:
  • Yong Gu
  • Wen Zhang
  • Yuxia Su
  • Xin Tang
  • T. Warren Liao
  • Mahmoud Mesbah

Abstract

The online freight platform, also called freight resource sharing platform or freight O2O platform, developed rapidly lately, has gradually become the leaders in China’s road freight market in recent years, especially in the intracity freight market. The platform’s revenue mainly comes from the registration fee and commission, of which the commission is extracted from the freight rate. Therefore, how to determine the registration fee and freight rate becomes a key issue for the platform. Our research focuses on analyzing the pricing strategy by considering the charging mode, game model, and affecting factors. Based on the two-sided market theory and the classic Hotelling model, a tripartite game model of online freight platform-carrier-consignor is constructed. Furthermore, a game model of consignor and alternative carriers is built by introducing the platform user’s psychological pressure and satisfaction priority into the model. Finally, through mathematical derivation and numerical experiment, we analyze the effects of various factors on platform profits, platform registration fees, and freight rate, and propose some suggestions to promote the orderly development of online freight platforms for the intracity freight market.

Suggested Citation

  • Yong Gu & Wen Zhang & Yuxia Su & Xin Tang & T. Warren Liao & Mahmoud Mesbah, 2023. "Two-Stage Game-Based Pricing Strategy for the Duopoly Online Freight Platform," Mathematical Problems in Engineering, Hindawi, vol. 2023, pages 1-18, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:1049758
    DOI: 10.1155/2023/1049758
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2023/1049758.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2023/1049758.xml
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2023/1049758?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:1049758. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mohamed Abdelhakeem (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.hindawi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.