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Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining

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  • Luís Carvalho

Abstract

Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely, the use of weakly dominated strategies. The paper then develops a refined equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection applied only on the replies, in order to overcome such weakness. Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extrarobustness and albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes do not change.

Suggested Citation

  • Luís Carvalho, 2013. "Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining," Journal of Applied Mathematics, Hindawi, vol. 2013, pages 1-10, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnljam:248968
    DOI: 10.1155/2013/248968
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