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Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market

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  • Longfei Wei
  • Haiwei Wang
  • Jing Wang
  • Jialong Hou
  • Mehmed Nurkanovic

Abstract

This paper investigates the dynamical behaviors of a Stackelberg mixed duopoly game with price competition in the insurance market, involving one state-owned public insurance company and one private insurance company. We study and compare the stability conditions for the Nash equilibrium points of two sequential-move games, public leadership, and private leadership games. Numerical simulations present complicated dynamic behaviors. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable as the price adjustment speed increases, and the system eventually becomes chaotic via flip bifurcation. Moreover, the time-delayed feedback control is used to force the system back to stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Longfei Wei & Haiwei Wang & Jing Wang & Jialong Hou & Mehmed Nurkanovic, 2021. "Dynamics and Stability Analysis of a Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Game with Price Competition in Insurance Market," Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, Hindawi, vol. 2021, pages 1-18, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnddns:3985367
    DOI: 10.1155/2021/3985367
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