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A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation

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  • Chuansheng Wang
  • Fulei Shi
  • Cuiyou Yao
  • Basil K. Papadopoulos

Abstract

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase

Suggested Citation

  • Chuansheng Wang & Fulei Shi & Cuiyou Yao & Basil K. Papadopoulos, 2020. "A Differential Game of Industrial Pollution Management considering Public Participation," Journal of Mathematics, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-8, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jjmath:6621331
    DOI: 10.1155/2020/6621331
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    Cited by:

    1. Lu, Juan & Li, He & Yang, Ran, 2024. "Effects of environmental liability insurance on illegal pollutant discharge of heavy polluting enterprises: Emission reduction incentives or pollution protector?," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).

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