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Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market

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  • Lingling Mu
  • Xiangyu Qin
  • Yuan Li
  • Ping Liu

Abstract

In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate operators (long-term apartment rental companies) in the housing rental market in the context of financial institutions and public participation in regulation and analyze the effects of different regulatory levels of financial institutions and the public on the evolutionary results through model solving and numerical simulation. The results show that, under five different levels of supervision, financial institutions and the public have different evolutionary and stable strategies; financial institutions’ participation in supervision can effectively reduce the cost of government supervision and promote the government’s evolution towards strict supervision. It is difficult for real estate operators to evolve naturally towards keeping their promises when the probability of the social public or financial institutions participating in regulation is low. Only when the probability of social public and financial institutions participating in regulation reaches a certain level will real estate operators be inclined to keep their promises.

Suggested Citation

  • Lingling Mu & Xiangyu Qin & Yuan Li & Ping Liu, 2020. "Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-10, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:complx:7370868
    DOI: 10.1155/2020/7370868
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