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Chaotic Behaviors in a Nonlinear Game of Two-Level Green Supply Chain with Government Subsidies

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  • Chang-Feng Zhu
  • Qing-Rong Wang

Abstract

In this paper, a two-level green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is taken as the background. Considering the consumer’s double consumption preference and the manufacturer’s green product R&D investment, a differential game model of the green supply chain under the government cost subsidy strategy is constructed. Firstly, the equilibrium points of the system are solved and their stability is discussed and analyzed. Secondly, the dynamic evolution process of Nash equilibrium under the parameters of green degree, green preference coefficient, retail channel preference coefficient, coefficient of the sensitivity of price, and adjustment speed are described by numerical simulation. The results show that the two ways of a system entering chaos are Flip bifurcation and N-S bifurcation, respectively, by 2D bifurcation graph, and it is also verified in 1D bifurcation diagram. When the bifurcation parameters are small, the system maintains Nash equilibrium stability. If the green degree of products is increased, the green preference coefficient will also increase; on the contrary, the retail preference coefficient will decrease. Research and development cost subsidy policy can effectively improve the green degree of products and increase the sales volume of products, so as to improve the profit of supply chain members.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang-Feng Zhu & Qing-Rong Wang, 2020. "Chaotic Behaviors in a Nonlinear Game of Two-Level Green Supply Chain with Government Subsidies," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2020, pages 1-12, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:hin:complx:6645506
    DOI: 10.1155/2020/6645506
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