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Game-Based Trust in Complex Networks: Past, Present, and Future

Author

Listed:
  • Li Yi
  • Weidong Fang
  • Wuxiong Zhang
  • Weiwei Gao
  • Baoqing Li
  • Jianxin Li

Abstract

As an efficient approach, the trust policy is implemented to defend against insider attacks in complex networks. However, the imperfection of trust relationships directly hinders the effort to quantitatively calculate trust value, especially in choosing a cooperative partner. Fortunately, the game theory is gradually concerned with addressing the above issue to further enhance security. In this paper, the game theory and the trust policy are reviewed briefly. Then, the research roadmap on game-based trust in complex networks is discussed and analysed deeply. Furthermore, some research directions in the near future are given. It is worth mentioning that our contributions not only describe the evolution of the game-based trust clearly but also suggest the trust mechanism based on the bounded rational game more suitable to uncertain information.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Yi & Weidong Fang & Wuxiong Zhang & Weiwei Gao & Baoqing Li & Jianxin Li, 2021. "Game-Based Trust in Complex Networks: Past, Present, and Future," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2021, pages 1-7, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:complx:6614941
    DOI: 10.1155/2021/6614941
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Ketian & Liu, Yang & Chen, Xiaojie & Szolnoki, Attila, 2022. "Evolution of trust in a hierarchical population with punishing investors," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    2. Zhou, Chen & Zhu, Yuying & Zhao, Dawei & Xia, Chengyi, 2024. "An evolutionary trust game model with group reputation within the asymmetric population," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

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