Game Theory and Sociology. Landmarks in Game Theory from a Sociological Perspective

In this paper we try to raise the question if it would be possible to create a distinctly sociological version of game theory, and what such a theory might look like. By a distinctly sociological version of game theory we mean a game theory that has been developed, methods and all, with substantive sociological problems in mind, and not simply the application of existing game theory (typically developed with mathematical and economic problems in mind) to sociological problems. In order to provide some background to this type of argument we go through some of the landmark studies in game theory and comment on these from a sociological perspective. In particular we try to see how these handle social interaction and the relationship of game theory to empirical reality. Included in our sample is von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), Nash’s work from 1950-1951, Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (1957), Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict (1960), Simon’s view of game theory, game theoretical analyses of institutions (Shubik and Schotter), Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) and the recent attempt by economic historians such as North and Greif to draw on game theory. We conclude by discussing a few criteria that a sociological game theory should fulfill, such as a covering a broad range of social interactions and being in much closer contact with empirical reality, both when it comes to inspiration for further advance and for verification.