Clean Heating Technology Diffusion with Government Departments’ and Commercial Banks’ Participation: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

As a key driver of the green and low-carbon transformation of the energy sector, clean heating technology plays a crucial role in advancing sustainable energy development. However, the research and development (R&D) of clean heating technology is hindered by conflicting interests among key supply-side stakeholders, including heating enterprises, commercial banks, and government departments. These conflicts create challenges for promoting the diffusion of clean heating technology. To address this issue, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving these stakeholders, with the aim of exploring strategies to facilitate clean heating technology diffusion from the supply side. Through mathematical modeling and numerical simulations, we examine how variables such as cost, subsidies, and penalties affect the strategic decisions of these participants. The results showusing that (1) the cost of clean heating technology R&D significantly influences commercial banks’ willingness to collaborate with heating enterprises; (2) increasing credit penalties for non-compliance and enhancing returns from clean heating technology can motivate heating enterprises to engage in technology R&D; (3) enhancing economic penalties and strengthening informal regulations can improve cooperation between commercial banks and heating enterprises; (4) moderate subsidies can positively influence the strategies adopted by commercial banks and heating enterprises. Based on these findings, we propose policy recommendations to promote clean heating technology diffusion from the supply side. This study offers both theoretical support and practical guidance for advancing clean heating technology diffusion, which is strategically important for sustainable energy development.