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Supply Chain Coordination of New Energy Vehicles under a Novel Shareholding Strategy

Author

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  • Zijia Liu

    (School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130015, China)

  • Guoliang Liu

    (School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun 130015, China)

Abstract

As important methods of ecofriendly transportation, the supply chain coordination of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is an important issue in the field of sustainability. This study constructs a Stackelberg game composed of a power battery supplier and an NEV manufacturer. To better describe the coordination relationship in the NEV supply chain, we introduce the Nash bargaining framework into the fairness concern preference utility function. Through a comprehensive discussion of shareholding ratios and external environment factors, we discover that the traditional shareholding strategy fails to coordinate the NEV supply chain effectively, as enterprises seek to avoid losing management control, which occurs when excessive shares are held by others. In this context, this study proposes a novel industry–university–research (IUR) shareholding strategy, which can more easily achieve supply chain coordination and improve social welfare. In particular, this study reveals the superiority of the novel strategy in eliminating the double-marginal effect caused by high fairness concern preference among NEV enterprises. Based on these facts, we provide enterprises with optimal strategies under different conditions and offer a government-optimal subsidy to maximize the social welfare function.

Suggested Citation

  • Zijia Liu & Guoliang Liu, 2024. "Supply Chain Coordination of New Energy Vehicles under a Novel Shareholding Strategy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-33, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:18:p:8046-:d:1478366
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    References listed on IDEAS

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